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FAILURES OF AMERICAN METHODS OF LAWMAKING IN HISTORICAL 
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, by James R. Maxeiner, 





There is no riskier comparative-law activity than engaging in an 
overall critical analysis of one’s own legal system using outside per-
spectives. The editor-in-chief of this Journal has had this experience, 
receiving praise from the comparatists but meeting the silence of the 
autochthone jurists: no review of his book was ever published, at 
least in the targeted country.1 The Journal of Civil Law Studies sa-
lutes the publication of James Maxeiner’ Failures of American Mod-
els of Lawmaking in Historical and Comparative Perspectives. It is 
without a doubt a controversial work and we found no better way of 
calling the attention of our readers to this highly stimulating book 
than creating contrast. We had it reviewed by a United States-trained 
scholar and by a bijural scholar trained in Germany and the United 
States, hoping to bring a diversity of readers to the actual book and 














 1. OLIVIER MORÉTEAU, LE JURISTE FRANÇAIS ENTRE ETHNOCENTRISME ET 
MONDIALISATION (Dalloz 2014). 





Review by Scott J. Burnham 
 
I will never forget the introduction to statutes I got in law school. 
My Contracts professor said at some point, “By the way, there’s this 
thing called the Uniform Commercial Code in the Appendix to your 
book. You might take a look at it some rainy day.” It seems like that 
rainy day never came for a lot of lawyers and judges, for cases in-
volving the sale of goods are still argued and opinions written with-
out reference to U.C.C. Article 2.1 
Sometimes it seems like things have not changed all that much 
in law schools since that day in my Contracts class some fifty years 
ago. I recently heard of a Contracts professor who is so insistent on 
teaching Contracts as common law that he deducts points from exam 
answers if the student brings up the Article 2 rule, even where it is 
applicable.  
Some law schools regard Criminal Law as the antidote to the 
heavy dose of common law, but my Criminal Law course was more 
like a philosophy class. I remember at one point the professor ex-
pressed concern for our lack of statutory fundamentals, complain-
ing exasperatedly, “You don’t know what the elements of homi-
cide are?” My response, doubtless under my breath, was, “Hell, I 
don’t even know what an element is.” Some law schools now re-
quire students to take a token short course in Legislation in the first 
year, but whatever they are taught about statutes does not seem to 
stick.  
When conducting legal research, for example, even though 
they know that courts have to follow applicable statutes, law stu-
dents persist in first searching for a rule in the cases. If they do find 
a statute, they are at a loss to say what the statute provides unless 
there is a case telling them what the statute says. A statute is 
 
 1. See, e.g., Austin Instrument Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E. 2d 533 (N.Y. 
1971); Rashid v. Jolly, 218 P.3d 499 (2009). 




apparently like a tree falling in the forest—it does not make a 
sound unless a court is there to hear it. In Contracts, the first statute 
students are likely to run into, U.C.C. section 2-207, is not a helpful 
corrective, for it may well be a statute that does not mean anything 
without a healthy dose of interpretation.  
Indeed, Article 2 may be a poor introduction to statutes, for it 
has been described as a “common law code.” Much of its application 
depends on courts to flesh out the meaning of its weasel words. For 
example, while section 2-302 allows a court to strike unconsciona-
ble terms or unconscionable contracts, there is little guidance in the 
text or the Official Comments as to how to determine whether a term 
is unconscionable. The statute only makes sense in light of its ac-
creted common law application. 
None of this would surprise James R. Maxeiner, whose Failures 
of American Methods of Lawmaking in Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives excoriates law schools for perpetuating the myth that 
the law is found in the common law. The first half of Maxeiner’s 
book is a welcome revisionist history. The party line has long been 
that the United States has historically been a common law country, 
and only recently have we entered “the age of statutes.” Maxeiner 
points out convincingly that we have always been a nation of stat-
utes, only creating the fabricated common law heritage in the late 
nineteenth century under the influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes 
and Christopher Columbus Langdell. 
Maxeiner would prefer we laud notables such as David Dudley 
Field, whose eponymous codes would have codified all of our law. 
While Field was unsuccessful in getting his Civil Code adopted in 
his native New York, it was adopted in California in 1872, followed 
by adoption in several other states, not to mention Guam. Soon after 
achieving statehood in 1889, Montana enacted its Civil Code, adopt-
ing practically wholesale the statutory scheme of California.  
Although I had been taught this view of the primacy of the com-
mon law, I thought things might change when I began teaching at 
the University of Montana. Surely, I thought, Montana, as a code 




state, would take a different approach to teaching contract law. I was 
quickly disillusioned. Dean Jack Mudd told me that after he had 
graduated from the law school and went to work as an associate in a 
Montana law firm, one of his first assignments was to draft jury in-
structions in a contracts case. “Use the statutes for the instructions 
on the law,” the partner told him. Only then did he discover that 
Montana had a statutory scheme for contract law. His Contracts pro-
fessor—the one I was hired to replace—had never mentioned the 
code. 
On some level this made sense, for most law schools aspire to 
be national in their reputations. Thus, they would not be so provin-
cial as to teach the law of the particular jurisdiction in which they 
were located. But Mudd had the insight that the Montana School of 
Law was not The Little Harvard of the West, and as the only law 
school in the state, it could have the courage to be true to itself as 
the Montana law school. In accord with Mudd’s view that we should 
be doing a better job to prepare students for the practice of law, I 
decided to incorporate these statutes into my teaching. Even if a 
graduate did not practice in Montana, I thought students would find 
the skills of working with statutes to be of value.  
But how do you teach statutes? I have taught U.S. law in civil 
law countries and found that the answer is often rote memorization. 
U.S. law students apply the law to the facts and to hypothetical facts 
from the first day of law school, and while this method may often 
lead to the unhappy conclusion that law is indeterminable, it also 
leads to the collection of skills that go by the shorthand of “thinking 
like a lawyer.” If graduates use those skills to practice law, will they 
really find it so hard to discover common law rules? They will have 
to find precedents, which their legal research skills (which Maxeiner 
disparages) should enable them to do efficiently. Because courts fol-
low precedents, they can pretty well predict what the outcome will 




be—unless the facts are so different that the rule should not apply. 
Which, to come full circle, is a strength of the common law system.2 
Even for those students who end up not practicing law, the crit-
ical reasoning skills are doubtless valuable. These skills are valuable 
because the rules, whether found in the common law or a code, 
rarely mean anything without a context. And the context in which 
they are applied is a case. When I put together my own materials to 
teach Contracts, I vowed that I would never use a case merely to 
extract a rule. If that is all the case is for, then we might as well just 
give students the rule, just as we would give them a statute. The 
value of the case is in analyzing the application of that rule to a par-
ticular fact situation.  
Here Maxeiner and the civilians might say, “Hold on a second—
in that last paragraph you spoke of a rule ‘found in the common law’ 
and you said you would instead ‘give students the rule.’ But you 
can’t do that because unlike the civil law, the common law cannot 
be found—no one knows what it is. You can’t give it to them be-
cause it is buried in the past cases and has to be extracted.” Maxeiner 
likes to blast the myths of the common law, but isn’t this one of the 
myths of the civil law—that, unlike the common law, code law is 
readily available? I am especially fond of the optimistic comment of 
Wilbur F. Sanders, a proponent of Montana’s codification of the 
law: 
[A] citizen of Montana, who has but little money to spend on 
books, needs to have lying on his table but three: an English 
Dictionary to teach [him] the knowledge of his own mother 
tongue; this Book of the Law [the Civil Code], to show him 
his rights as a member of civilized society; and the good old 
Family Bible to teach him his duties to God and to man.3  
 
 2. Another weakness of codes is their inflexibility, freezing the law at a par-
ticular stage of development. For example, prior to 1979, the Montana Code in-
cluded Field Code § 13, which provided that “Persons of unsound mind, within 
the meaning of this code, are idiots, lunatics, imbeciles, and habitual drunkards.” 
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 64-104 (repealed 1979). 
 3. HENRY M. FIELD, THE LIFE OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 92 (Charles Scrib-
ner’s Sons 1898) (quoting Wilbur F. Sanders), quoted in Andrew P. Morriss, Scott 




As to the availability of the common law rules, I suspect that for 
as long as there has been common law, there have been scholars and 
entrepreneurs who provided us with the short cut of extracting the 
pure metal rules from the ore of the past decisions. In England, this 
function was served by Coke and Blackstone. In the United States 
today, it is served by the Restatements. By giving the students a Re-
statement principle, I am giving them a shortcut (and a powerful 
disclaimer needs to be added as to the limitations of this shortcut) to 
the common law. Thus, the common law rules are readily available. 
Maxeiner does not have a kind word to say about U.S. legal ed-
ucation, with which he has apparently been bound in an unhappy 
marriage for many years. He mentions that in the German system, 
the judges apply the facts to the law to come to a conclusion (where 
there is no jury involved, I fail to see how this system differs from 
the U.S. system). He then makes the amazing statement that German 
law students learn how to do this after they graduate from law 
school! So, what have they done in law school? One can only hazard 
the guess that they have spent their time memorizing codes in order 
to learn the law. But what is the point of that if the law is so readily 
accessible and knowable? 
In any event, I have my doubts that the rules are easy to find in 
a code. Let’s say I am teaching contract formation. If I go to the 
Montana Civil Code, section 28-2-102(4) tells me that for a contract 
we need “a sufficient cause or consideration.”4 What is that? Section 
28-2-801 provides: 
What constitutes good consideration. Any benefit con-
ferred or agreed to be conferred upon the promisor by any 
other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully entitled, 
or any prejudice suffered or agreed to be suffered by the per-
son, other than prejudice that the person is at the time of con-
sent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the 
 
J. Burnham & James C. Nelson, Debating the Field Civil Code 105 Years Late, 
61 Mont. L. Rev. 371, 380 (2000). 
 4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-102(4) (2019). 




promisor is a good consideration for a promise.5 
This is a helpful definition of consideration, and we can unpack 
it with profit. But to really get a grip on it, we need some context. 
Cases like Hamer v. Sidway,6 Kirksey v. Kirksey,7 Wood v. Lucy, 
Lady Duff-Gordon,8 and hypotheticals like “Williston’s Tramp”9 
are staples of first-year law study for good reason—they give us the 
context to make the rule meaningful. After wrestling with such 
cases, I think U.S. law students get a pretty good sense of how to 
concoct and identify this mysterious glue that binds contracts to-
gether. In fact, didn’t Mr. Field derive his rule by synthesizing 
cases? So, it would seem that study of the cases gives us both the 
rule and also a better understanding of the rule since we have seen 
its application in context. 
Let’s now go back to the rule we found in the Montana Code. 
Having acquired a working knowledge of consideration from the 
Code definition, we are only halfway to understanding that element 
of contract formation, for section 28-1-102 mentioned “cause” as an 
alternative to consideration. Where is its definition? Alas, it disap-
pears from the Code after that initial mention. Curious about what it 
is, I found a law review article on the topic.10 Tracking the long his-
tory of cause, Professor Keyes seems to define it as the absence of 
consideration. Curiously, in the more than 150 years since that stat-
ute was adopted in California, no attorney seems to have argued, “I 
may not have consideration for this contract, but I don’t need it be-
cause according to the California Civil Code, I can have cause as an 
alternative.” I’m not sure if the reason for this gap is because this 
 
 5. Id. at § 28-2-801 (derived from Field Civ. C. § 780). 
 6. Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
 7. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845). 
 8. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917); see also 
Scott J. Burnham, Understated Elegance: Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gor-
don, in The Best and Worst of Contracts Decisions: An Anthology, 45 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 889, 907 (2018). 
 9. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:18 (2018). 
 10. William Noel Keyes, Cause and Consideration in California—A Re-Ap-
praisal, 47 CAL. L. REV. 74 (1959). 




particular code has provided us with a red herring, or because 
Maxeiner is right that we denigrate codes as a source of law. 
On many occasions I have been frustrated by the Montana 
Code as a source of law because I have seen how courts can ma-
nipulate it, often cherry-picking inapplicable statutes in order to 
reach a desired result. An egregious example is Miller v. Fallon 
County.11 One of the issues in Miller was the enforceability of an 
exculpatory clause. This seems to me a difficult issue for a code to 
deal with, because enforceability depends on so many variables. A 
statute could easily outlaw exculpatory clauses for personal injury, 
as is the case in Louisiana, perhaps not coincidentally a civil law 
jurisdiction.12 But that solution seems to go too far, for the com-
mon law sensibly says that exculpatory clauses have a place in pri-
vate ordering where there is a negotiated contract in an area that 
lacks public interest.  
In an excellent example of common law analysis, Tunkl v. 
Board of Regents,13 the California Supreme Court determined that 
an exculpatory clause was not enforceable when entered into by a 
patient seeking hospital services. The court then laid down fac-
tors—though these work better as elements—for courts to examine 
in order to determine application of the rule in various contexts.14 
Using these factors, California courts later determined, for exam-
ple, that an exculpatory clause was not enforceable in a residential 
lease but was enforceable in an agreement between a professional 
driver and a race track.15 This seems to me an example of the com-
mon law at its best. I am not sure how a code could deal with these 
subtleties. 
 
 11. Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P. 2d 342 (Mont. 1986). 
 12. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (2018). 
 13. Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 
1963). 
 14. See Scott J. Burnham, Are You Free to Contract Away Your Right to 
Bring a Negligence Claim?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379 (2014). 
 15. See, e.g., Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1978); 
Nat’l & Int’l Brotherhood of Street Racers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 
3d 934 (1989). 




Now the scene switches to Montana. In Haynes v. County of 
Missoula,16 a case where the exculpatory clause was found in the 
entry form that an exhibitor signed when entering an exhibit in the 
Missoula County Fair, the Supreme Court of Montana first exam-
ined the Code provisions on illegality, and correctly found that a 
provision is not illegal unless it is contrary to the public interest. In 
order to determine the extent of public interest in this case, the Court 
looked at the test laid out in Tunkl, and determined that, while the 
case was close, there was sufficient public interest in a county fair 
that the exculpatory clause was not enforceable. One may disagree 
with the outcome, but it is hard to find fault with the analysis as an 
example of common law reasoning. 
A few years later, in Miller v. Fallon County,17 the same court 
was faced with the issue of the enforceability of an exculpatory 
clause that had been signed by the wife of a long-distance truck 
driver in order to secure permission from the trucking company to 
accompany her husband on his travels. I don’t think there would be 
much doubt that application of the Tunkl test would lead to enforce-
ability, so the Court, determined to find for the plaintiff, had to take 
a different route. It ignored the Tunkl test used as precedent in 
Haynes, and instead looked to the statutes on illegality. It found this 
one: 
Contracts that violate policy of law—exemption from re-
sponsibility—exception. Except as provided in 27-1-
753, all contracts that have for their object, directly or indi-
rectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for the person’s 
own fraud, for willful injury to the person or property of an-
other, or for violation of law, whether willful or negligent, 
are against the policy of the law.18 
Well, the court reasoned, this statute says that it is illegal to put 
in a contract a provision that is contrary to law, so let us ask, what 
 
 16. Haynes v. County of Missoula, 517 P.2d 370 (Mont. 1973). 
 17. Miller, 721 P. 2d 342, supra note 11. 
 18. MONT. CODE ANN., supra note 4, at § 28-2-702 (derived from Field Civ. 
C. § 828). 




is law? It includes tort law, which says we aren’t supposed to commit 
torts without facing consequences. So, it must be illegal to put in a 
contract that one may commit a tort without consequence. Thus, the 
exculpatory clause is illegal—as are all exculpatory clauses. The ap-
preciation for context, for different results in different situations, 
which characterized the common law analysis of the issue in Tunkl, 
is gone, replaced by the inflexible rule derived from a code. A com-
mon law court could have come to the same conclusion, but along the 
way to that conclusion it would have had to show us why it was 
against the public interest to allow the exculpatory clause in this con-
text. 
As another example of the difficulty of codifying a complex rule, 
the Montana court does not like the finality of worker’s compensation 
settlements when the injuries turn out to have been greater than the 
parties thought they were at the time of settlement. Historically, one 
of the best tools to attack such a settlement is the doctrine of mutual 
mistake. In Kienas v. Peterson,19 for example, the Court found the 
settlement voidable on grounds of mistake but conveniently omitted 
discussion of the issue of whether the claimant had assumed the risk 
of being mistaken. 
In a later case, Wolfe v. Webb,20 the Court had to face that issue, 
since the settlement contained clear language indicating that it would 
be binding even though the parties were mistaken about the extent of 
the injuries. The Court took a close look at the Code rule on mistake. 
Section 28-2-102 tells us that the parties have to consent to the con-
tract, and section 28-2-301 tells us the consent has to be free.21 Sec-
tion 28-2-401 tells us that consent is not free when obtained through 
mistake.22 
What is mistake? Section 28-2-409 tells us: 
What constitutes mistake of fact. Mistake of fact is a 
 
 19. Kienas v. Peterson, 624 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1980). 
 20. Wolfe v. Webb, 824 P.2d 240 (Mont. 1992). 
 21. MONT. CODE ANN., supra note 4, at §§ 28-2-102(2), 28-2-301(1). 
 22. Id. at § 28-2-401(e). 




mistake not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part 
of the person making the mistake and consisting in: 
(1) an unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact, 
past or present, material to the contract; or 
(2) belief in the present existence of a thing material to the 
contract which does not exist or in the past existence of such 
a thing which has not existed.23 
Where is the rule that a mistake has to be mutual or the rule that 
one can accept the risk of being mistaken? There are no such rules 
in Mr. Field’s code! Therefore, when there is mistake, there is no 
consent, and when there is no consent, there is no contract. This 
analysis seems correct on the face of the Code, which leaves out an 
important element of mistake—assumption of the risk of being mis-
taken—that distinguishes it from the other defenses. And rather than 
read that omission into the Code, the court was content to use the 
omission when it served its purposes. 
If the law is more accessible when found in the form of a code, 
these examples certainly don’t demonstrate it. Maxeiner might ar-
gue that these problems are traceable to the way this Code is drafted, 
though he does not have a negative word to say about the Field 
Code. More likely, he would argue that the problem is traceable to 
the way it has been employed by users unfamiliar with a code sys-
tem. To illustrate the advantage of a code system, in the second half 
of the book Maxeiner gives us a concrete comparison of two legal 
systems, the German and the American.  
The book comes alive for a moment at the beginning of this com-
parative section when, to illustrate his point, he uses the hypothetical 
of a person who wishes to know the applicable law in order to drive 
a horse trailer across the country. In Germany, there is only one body 
of law to look to. In the United States, the laws are found in interstate 
commerce law as well as in the laws of various states and counties, 
much of it hard to find. Actually, the example may be even more 
complex than Maxeiner indicates, for our traveler would no doubt 
 
 23. Id. at § 28-2-409 (derived from Field Civ. C. § 762). 




pass through Indian Country, and those jurisdictions have their own 
laws that may well differ from the law of the state in which the res-
ervation is located.  
This example lets us down, however, because most of the rele-
vant law is regulatory—it is found in statutes rather than in the com-
mon law. The example, therefore, does not demonstrate the superi-
ority of statutes to the common law; it demonstrates a weakness of 
American federalism. When each jurisdiction is permitted to have 
its own law, it can indeed be difficult to plan a multistate transaction. 
But isn’t this weakness of federalism also a strength? Why 
should the horse law of Montana, where horses are used recreation-
ally and in ranch work, be the same as the horse law of Pennsylva-
nia, where horse-drawn buggies are a common mode of transporta-
tion in some communities, or the same as the horse law of Kentucky, 
where horses are bred commercially?  
Rather than furthering his argument that code law is superior to 
common law, Maxeiner’s example instead launches a new argu-
ment—that much of U.S. statutory law is not code law at all, for the 
statutes lack the integrity found in a true code. The case of the U.S. 
Code being merely a dog’s breakfast of assembled and sometimes 
contradictory statutes is the prime example. Again, I am convinced, 
and anyone would agree that where we do have codes, we should 
have workable codes.  
Much of this section on codes is given over to a dry survey of 
the German code scheme, again with few examples. It appears that 
the vaunted German efficiency extends to their codes as well. 
Maxeiner tells us “In Germany finding governing laws is easy and 
unproblematic. Minutes, not days or hours, are required.” I decided 
to test this proposition by seeing if I could find answers in the Ger-
man code to the problems that puzzled me in my use of the Montana 
Code: 1) What is consideration—or more broadly, what is required 
for an enforceable contract? 2) Will a contract be avoided for mis-
take when a party has assumed the risk of being mistaken? 3) When 
will an exculpatory clause be enforced? 




I had no trouble finding the German Civil Code (BGB).24 Here 
is what I found during my inquiry: 
1. Consideration. In my search for how the German code deals 
with consideration, I found that Title 3, Contract, Sections 145 et 
seq., jumps right into offer and acceptance but omits discussion of 
any other element of formation. I then did a word search for consid-
eration and found that there are provisions that talk about consider-
ation in a context very much like the U.S. conception of it. For ex-
ample, Section 316 seems similar to U.S. law that provides for what 
to do when no price is stated in the contract.25 It provides: 
“Specification of consideration. If the extent of the consideration 
promised for an act of performance is not specified, then in case of 
doubt the party that is owed the consideration is entitled to make the 
specification.”26  
This provision assumes consideration, yet I see no earlier provi-
sion that goes to the heart of the question—which promises is our 
society going to enforce, and if it is going to enforce those that are 
supported by consideration, then what is consideration? 
2. Mistake. It was easy to find the provision addressing mistake. 
Section 119 provides: 
Voidability for mistake. (1) A person who, when making a 
declaration of intent, was mistaken about its content or had 
no intention whatsoever of making a declaration with this 
content, may avoid the declaration if it is to be assumed that 
he would not have made the declaration with knowledge of 
the factual position and with a sensible understanding of the 
case.27 
Without more, I am not sure this section answers my question. 
Is a person “mistaken about its contents” when he enters a contract 
to settle a claim for injuries for $10,000 when his injuries in fact 
 
 24. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], translation at https:// 
perma.cc/W4AJ-Y3MC (Ger.). 
 25. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305. 
 26. BGB § 316 (Ger.). 
 27. Id. at § 119. 




amount to $100,000, but he does not know that at the time? And can he 
agree to accept the risk of being mistaken? If this section is merely a 
starting point for analysis, then it would seem we are in the same position 
we would be in if researching the question under a common law regime. 
3. Exculpatory clause. It was also easy to find Section 309 on pro-
hibited clauses: 
Prohibited clauses without the possibility of evaluation. 
Even to the extent that a deviation from the statutory provi-
sions is permissible, the following are ineffective in standard 
business terms: 
7. (Exclusion of liability for injury to life, body or health and 
in case of gross fault) 
a) (Injury to life, body or health) [A]ny exclusion or limita-
tion of liability for damage from injury to life, body or health 
due to negligent breach of duty by the user or intentional or 
negligent breach of duty by a legal representative or a person 
used to perform an obligation of the user; 
b) (Gross fault) any exclusion or limitation of liability for 
other damage arising from a grossly negligent breach of duty 
by the user or from an intentional or grossly negligent breach 
of duty by a legal representative of the user or a person used 
to perform an obligation of the user . . . .28 
This provision seems to answer our questions about the enforce-
ability of an exculpatory clause. Section 305 defines “standard busi-
ness terms” similarly to how U.S. law defines a contract of adhesion, 
so this provision, like the common law cases discussed earlier, dis-
tinguishes between an exculpatory clause in a contract of adhesion 
and in a negotiated contract. It prohibits the clause only in the for-
mer, leaving the implication that it would be enforceable in the lat-
ter. Similar to the U.S. cases, it appears to prohibit clauses that ex-
culpate from gross negligence or intentional torts. In the area of sim-
ple negligence, it seems to prohibit all exculpatory clauses, without 
consideration of whether the activity is in the public interest. One 
can argue that that is an overly inclusive prohibition, but one cannot 
argue that it is not clear. 
 
 28. Id. at § 309.  




It is quite possible that my search for answers in the German code 
scheme reflects my own inadequacies rather than those of the code. How-
ever, my limited goal was to test Maxeiner’s proposition that I could find 
the answers in minutes. My search results indicate that the German code 
may not be as simple to access as Maxeiner would have us believe.29 
In conclusion, Maxeiner has convinced me that in the United States, 
we have long lived in an age of statutes. He has also convinced me that 
these statutes are not as well written or organized as some of the codes 
he admires, especially those of Germany. But he has not convincingly 
made the argument that I expected him to make—that codes are prefer-
able to common law. 
Coincidentally, I recently read another book that draws comparisons 
between U.S. law and German law—James Q. Whitman’s Hitler’s 
American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law 
(2017) I was particularly struck by a short passage in Whitman’s conclu-
sion. I knew that Franklin D. Roosevelt felt stymied because he believed 
the national emergency of the depression demanded rapid change in the 
law that the Supreme Court would not permit. What I did not know was 
that Nazi jurists felt the same way about the national emergency in Ger-
many. If only we were not restricted by our codes, they thought. If only 
we had a common law system like that in the U.S. where the judges could 
make the law needed to meet the emergency.30 That insight caused me 
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 29. I am grateful for the assistance of Dlovan Schlato, a student at Gonzaga 
University School of Law and a graduate of Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Uni-
versität Bonn. Ms. Schlato advises me that one would never rely solely on the 
Code but would also consult the Commentary (Kommentar)—advice that 
Maxeiner did not provide. 
 30. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 153–58 (Princeton U. Press 2017). 





Review by Markus G. Puder 
   
James Maxeiner’s book makes a welcome contribution to the 
conversation about comparative law in the United States. It truly is 
a great read—not only because of its provocative contents but also 
because of its personal tone. 
The thread of the book is clear from the outset. Functional soci-
eties are predicated on a government of laws. America’s legal sys-
tem is broken. Germany has a working legal system. Maxeiner or-
ganizes his storyline into a historical part, which establishes the 
American baseline, and a comparative part, which juxtaposes the 
American and the German experiences, including a creative case 
study. From the vast array of topics raised by Maxeiner, instructors 
could easily tier a complement of stand-alone modules for purposes 
of creating a full course in comparative law. Those interested might 
find the architecture of the book coupled with the wealth of refer-
ences immensely helpful for such an endeavor.  
 Maxeiner’s book, rich in themes deserving of dialogue, does not 
shrink from vigorous debate. You do not have to agree with the au-
thor in every instance. Ultimately, it is all about leaving the echo 
chamber that appears to increasingly parochialize our comparative 
law. For example, I was recently privy to a conversation between 
two practitioners about a legal transplant. When it came to the ques-
tion of what the model actually said in the language of the donor 
system, one of the interlocutors asserted that “there are translations.” 
But what if the translation is inaccurate? What might the client of 
that attorney say or do in such a case? As I have experienced in the 
context of my own bilingual (English-German) edition of the Loui-
siana Civil Code,1 the comparative legal academy has become much 
narrower than it used to be when it comes to law and language. In a 
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similar vein, too many comparative law journals in the United States 
consider the dyad of legal translation and comparative law, or com-
parative law and legal translation, a topic too specific for their read-
ership. In an increasingly smaller world, this posture seems peculiar 
at best.2 During the plurilingual and plurijural days of Louisiana, our 
most illustrious jurists were masters of the art of bridging law and 
language.  
Similarly, whether the common law system or the civil law sys-
tem is “superior” is not the point—reasonable people may reasona-
bly differ in their views. But the conversation about both systems 
must be had and it must continue. Comparative law is a living and 
breathing creature. In mixed jurisdictions we know this all too well. 
Take, for example, the Louisiana trust.3 To this day, the literature 
and the jurisprudence offer different models of explication when it 
comes to reconciling the common law notions of formal and bene-
ficial title with Louisiana’s unitary conception of ownership. More-
over, Louisiana needed to mollify its rule of immediate vesting and 
remove the trust from the prohibition of substitutions. Arguably, 
Louisiana has managed to split the atom by offering a body of trust 
law that is fully functional within the American Union.  
Another important theme raised by Maxeiner involves codified 
law and codifications. Again, there is much room for fruitful dia-
logue. Significantly, a code is not a code in the United States. From 
a Louisiana perspective, our code is “harder” than the codes more 
fully discussed by Maxeiner. The Louisiana Civil Code embodies 
the solemn expression of the legislature. While jurisprudence con-
tinues to fill and push the limits of the principles féconds en 
conséquences, courts are bound by the legislated law of the code. 
Especially in the wake of our civilian Renaissance, which took hold 
in the 1960s, Louisiana state courts and federal Erie courts have 
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stayed the course. Understandably though, courts are rightfully irked 
when the legislature in turn resorts to “fixing” specific judicial de-
cisions deemed not true to a particular redactor’s preferred reading 
of the law. In Louisiana, this occurred, for example, in the context 
of a controversy over Louisiana’s law of fixtures (“attachments”).4 
In contrast to the Louisiana Civil Code, California’s Civil Code, 
meanwhile quite aged, offers a snapshot of the ambient common law 
of the time. Significantly, the code embraces the common law pro-
cess and method of moving the law forward. Both features have en-
couraged the judiciary to be more assertive when it comes to abro-
gating and replacing codal law. For example, California’s Supreme 
Court took it upon itself to replace by judicial fiat contributory with 
comparative negligence even in the face of the properly construed 
codal text.  
Codes also differ in their style, transparency and readability. 
Germany’s Civil Code is basically written for professional lawyers. 
It is replete with legalisms. Laypersons therefore face the basic chal-
lenge of understanding its legal terminology and drafting technique. 
In contrast, with its down-to-earth tone and accessible vocabulary, 
the Swiss Civil Code is probably the most user-friendly codification 
in the German law and language sphere. In Louisiana, the difference 
among the redactors taking ownership of portions of the document, 
as it continues to be revised in waves, has resulted in numerous sty-
listic and substantive fissures. Redactors have frequently brought 
their indigenous and disparate cultures of origin to bear. This makes 
the Louisiana Civil Code not only a challenging but also a volumi-
nous document, even if core areas of private law, such as the Trust 
Code and the Children’s Code, are housed elsewhere.  
Finally, Maxeiner makes no bones about his preference for Ger-
many’s approach to a government of laws. Might this reflect his ex-
perience of learning from one of the revered teachers and scholars 
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at the Ludwig-Maximilians University in Munich—the late Profes-
sor Wolfgang Fikentscher? In the context of the functionality of 
Germany’s system, one more observation comes to mind. The arri-
val of the European Union, with its regulatory rage (Regelungswut) 
and governance paradigm of commandeering progressively expand-
ing areas of competence, has dramatically altered trajectories to-
wards a government of laws in Europe, including Germany. The de-
bates about curvature of the cucumber (Krümmung der Gurke) has 
become the emblematic image for this proposition. Time for a se-
quel, Prof. Maxeiner? Sis felix! 
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